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A Constitutional Analysis of the New Delaware
Director-Consent-to-Service Statute
In Sha.ffer v. Heitner 1 the United States Supreme Court defined the boundaries the due process clause imposes on the power of states to control the activities of nonresident corporate directors. In Sha.ffer the Court struck down
Delaware's sequestration method of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident directors of its corporations.2 The Delaware sequestration statute permitted a
court to seize a nonresident defendant's property located within the state,
thereby forcing the defendant either to appear and contest the merits of the
suit or to default and incur liability for the value of the seized assets. 3 The
Court held that assertion of such jurisdiction violated due process because the
nonresident directors lacked minimum contacts with the state.4 Thus, Sha.ffer
effectively restricted the Delaware courts' jurisdiction over nonresident directors of Delaware corporations.5
In an attempt to regain state court jurisdiction over nonresident corporate
directors, the Delaware legislature enacted a statute providing that a nonresident who accepts a position as a director of a Delaware corporation thereby
consents to jurisdiction over him in any action arising out of his activities as a
director. 6 The Delaware Supreme Court, in Armstrong v. Pomerance/ addressed the constitutionality of the new director-consent-to-service statute in
light of Sha.ffer's due process limitations8 and determined that it complied with
the due process clause.9 Such statutes nevertheless pose serious due process
problems when they are construed to permit state courts to exercise jurisdiction
over nonresidents who have no contact with the forum other than their directorships of state-chartered corporations.
This note examines the limits the due process clause imposes on state court
jurisdiction in order to determine whether the Delaware statute is constitutional. The note begins by analyzing both Shf!ifor and the Delaware statute.
By tracing the evolution of the minimum contacts requirement, the note demonstrates that minimum contacts analysis requires the court to make a
threshold finding that the individual acted purposefully to create a contact
with the forum before considering whether the state has a sufficient interest in
the matter to warrant its exercise of jurisdiction. The note then analyzes the
Delaware statute in light of this minimun:t contacts test and concludes that the
statute is unconstitutional because acceptance of a directorship does not constitute a purposeful act sufficient to create minimum contacts. The note examines
I. 433 u.s. 186 (1977).
2. 433 U.S. at 212 {invalidating DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 {1974)).
3. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 {1974).
4. 433 U.S. at 212.
5. The sequestration procedure had been the principal means of obtaining personal jurisdiction over
nonresident corporate directors. Ratner & Schwartz, 'I7te Impact ~?[Shaffer v. Heitner on the Substantive Law ~?(Corporations, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 641, 643 (1979).
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 {1980).
7. 423 A.2d 174 (Del 1980).
8. Id at 176.
9. Id at 179.
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Armstrong v. Pomerance, in which the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the
statute, and argues that it does not provide an alternative rationale for upholding the statute. Finally, the note recognizes the need for a limited exception to
the minimum contacts requirement, but proposes that the principal place of
business, rather than the state of incorporation, should be the forum for such
exceptional cases.

I.

SHAFFER AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

In Sha.ffer v. Heitner the plaintiff filed a shareholder derivative suit in Delaware Chancery Court alleging that the directors of Greyhound Corporation
had violated their fiduciary duties to the corporation. 10 Greyhound was incorporated in Delaware, with its. principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona.11 None of the directors lived in Delaware, and none of the actions in
question had occurred in Delaware. 12 Unable to obtain personal jurisdiction
over the nonresident directors because of these circumstances, the plaintiff obtained an order sequestering the defendants' stocks. 13 The seq~estration of
their stocks compelled the nonresident directors to appear, and the court exercised quasi in rem jursdiction over them. 14
The Delaware Chancery Court rejected the defendants' arguments that Delaware could not assert jurisdiction over them because they lacked minimum
contacts with the state. 15 Affirming the Chancery Court's decision, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the defendants' contacts with the forum state
were relevant only when the plaintiff sought in personam jurisdiction.l 6 The
Delaware Supreme Court thus viewed contacts as irrelevant when, as here, the
plaintiff sought quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the presence of the defendants' stock in Delaware, 17 rather than in personam jurisdiction.
10. 433 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1977). The plaintiff alleged that the defendant directors breached their
duties by causing Greyhound Corporation and a Greyhound subsidiary to engage in actions that resulted in liability for substantial damages in a private antitrust suit and a large fine in a criminal
contempt action. I d. at 190.
11. /d. at 189.
12. /d. at 190-91.
13. I d. The purpose of the sequestration procedure was to compel a nonresident defendant to enter o
personal appearance. /d. at 193 (quoting Delaware Chancery Court letter opinion in Greyhound Corp.
v. Heitner). If the non-resident did not appear to defend on the merits, his sequestered property could
be used to pay a default judgment DEL. CODE ANN. tiL 10, § 366 (1974). Under Delaware low, the
situs of the corporation's stock is the state of incorporation. /d. at tit. 8, § 169. Thus, the directors' stock
in Greyhound was statutorily present in the forum, and the court could seize it.
14. 433 U.S. at 194. Traditionally, a state court must rely on one of three bases for any exercise of
jurisdiction. If the court's power stems from authority over the defendant's person, the action and
judgment are in personam. I d. at 199. Courts with in personam jurisdiction can issue judgments affecting all the property of the defendant. Jurisdiction based on a court's power over a defendant's property
within the state is in rem or quasi in rem./d. In such cases, the judgment is limited to the value of the
property on which the court has based its jurisdiction. I d. The basis of in rem jurisdiction is property
present in the state that is the subject of the suit and is owned by the defendant. In rem judgments
affect the interests of all persons in the designated property. I d. at 199 n.l7. Quasi in rem jurisdiction
arises when the defendant has property unrelated to the subject matter of the suit in the forum and the
judgment affects only the interests of the parties in that property. I d.
15. I d. at 193 (quoting Court of Chancery letter opinion in Greyhound v. Heitner). The defendants
had entered a special appearance and disputed the sequestration order's validity. Id. at 192-93.
16. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976), rev'd mh nom. Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 u.s. 186 (1977).
17. Id
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Delaware court's
decision, and held that all assertions of state court jurisdiction, whether in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem, must be evaluated according to the minimum
contacts standard of International Shoe Co. v.. Washington . 18 Under the minimum contacts test established in International Shoe, a state may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident if the person has "contacts, ties, and relations" with
the forum state sufficient to render the exercise of jurisdiction fair. 19 The Shcifftr Court reasoned that because the sequestered property was not the subject
matter of the suit and was not related to the cause of action, it did not provide
contacts sufficient to support jurisdiction.20 The Court then examined the defendants' relationship with Delaware and stated that the defendants' acceptance of directorships in a Delaware corporation did not, without more, satisfy
the minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe .21
The Court rejected the contention that Delaware's strong interest in supervising the management of Delaware corporations justified its assertion of jurisdiction over corporate directors. 22 Instead, the Court questioned the interest
itself, noting that Delaware had not enacted a statute embodying the interest.23
Even if such an interest did exist, the Court went on, such an interest would
support the application of Delaware law to the controversy, but could not supply those minimum contacts that would justify the state's exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresidents. 24 The Court also mentioned that because the state
had not provided notice of its intent to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents
through a long-arm statute,25 the defendant directors had no reason to expect
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945), cited in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,212 (1977). For a discussion of the
justifications for a lower contacts requirement for quasi in rem jurisdiction than for in personam jurisdiction, see Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: Tlze End of on Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 67-79 (1978).
19. 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); see notes 40-48 infra and accompanying text (discussing International
Shoe).
20. 433 U.S. at 213.
21. Id at 216-17. Justice Brennan dissented from the portion of the Court's opinion in which the
Court held that the nonresident directors lacked minimum contacts. Id at 220..28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan believed that the Court should not have reached
the question of minimum contacts because the State of Delaware had not purported to base jurisdiction
on the defendants' contacts with the state. Id at 220:-22. In his view, the issue was not ripe, and the
Court's opinion was thus only advisory. Id Justice Brennan also argued that state courts generally
should have jurisdiction to adjudicate shareholder derivative actions involving the conduct and policies
of directors and officers of a corporation chartered by that state. Id at 222.
22. Id at 214.
23. Id
24. Id at 215. Nevertheless, some co=entators have remarked that the contacts requirment for
choice of law purposes should be greater than that for jurisdiction because choice of law lias a greater
impact on the substantive rights of the parties. See Ratner & Schwartz, supra noteS, at 656 (paradoxical that Delaware interest based on stock ownership insufficient to justify Delaware forum, but act of
incorporating sufficient to apply Delaware law); Silberman, supra note 18, at 82, 88 (if contacts sufficient to require application of forum's law, forum should also exercise jurisdiction); see also notes 64-70
i'!fra and accompanying text (discussing relationship between defendant's contacts with forum and
state's interest in minimum contacts analysis). Justice Brennan, in his Shq!fer dissent, stressed that the
jurisdictional inquiry and the choice oflaw inquiry are more closely related than the Shq!fer opinion
indicated. 433 U.S. at 224-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
25. 433 U.S. at 224-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In noting Delaware's
failure to enact such a statute, the Court specifically referred to long-arm statutes enacted by other
states which provided that a director consents to the incorporating state's jurisdiction when he accepts
the directorship. Id at 216 n.47; see note 39 infra (citing pre-Sha.lfer cases upholding constitutionality
of state long-arm statutes reaching nonresident corporate directors).
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that they might be haled before a Delaware court.26
Shqffer thus invalidated Delaware's primary method of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident directors of its corporations.27 The Delaware General
Corporation Law Committee of the Delaware Bar Association saw the situation created by Shajfer as a vacuum that needed to be filled by legislation
restoring jurisdiction.28 The Committee also viewed the Court's references to
other states' director-consent statutes as an invitation to enact a nonresident
director-consent-to-service statute.29
The Committee's primary justification for the statute was the internal affairs
rule, which provides that a chartering state's law generally governs the fiduciary duties of the corporation's directors.30 The Committee anticipated that
without some means of securing jurisdiction over nonresident directors, jurisdiction rules would generally preclude Delaware courts from adjudicating
cases arising under that law, although choice of law considerations would dictate the application of Delaware law.31 Thus, tribunals chosen by plaintiffs
would be forced to speculate about how the Delaware courts would resolve the
dispute. 32 Moreover, the Committee anticipated that aggrieved shareholders
would be deprived of the opportunity to bring all corporate defendants together in one forum.33
The Delaware General Assembly enacted the recommended statute without
dissent. 34 The new statute treats the acceptance of a position as a director of a
Delaware-chartered corporation as implied consent to Delaware jurisdiction in
causes of action arising from the director's duties to the corporation.3 5 The
26. 433 U.S. at 216.
27. Jacobs & Stargatt, The New Delaware Director Consent-to-Service Statute, 33 Bus. LAW. 701,701
(1978).
28. Id The authors of the article were members of the Committee. I d. at 701 n.3.
29. Id. at 705.
30. See id. at 703 n.33 (except when federal law preempts field, state law governs internal affairs)
(citing Cart v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). The internar affairs rule provides that a chartering state's Jaws
govern the fiduciary duties of corporate directors unless a different state has greater interest in the
matter. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 309 (1979); see notes 138-41/nfta and ac•
companying text (discussing choice oflaw principles that might indicate application of law other than
chartering state).
31. Jacobs & Stargatt,.rupra note 27, at 605;see Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 650 (if Delaware
long-arm statute unconstitutional, choice of law iules usually would dictate application of Delaware
law by non-Delaware courts).
32. Jacobs & Stargatt, supra note 27, at 705.
33. Id (without director-consent statute, shareholder would have to sue different directors in differ·
ent states or select a target director; defendant selected could not implead other directors not in same
forum); see Ratner & Schwartz, .rupra.note 5, at 650 (if Delaware long-arm statute unconstitutional and
shareholder unable to bring derivative suit anywhere else, shareholder might be denied remedy).
34. Jacobs & Stargatt, .rul'.ra note 27, at 705.
35. Id. The statute provzdes in part:
(e]very nomesident of (Delaware] who . . . accepts election or appointment as a director ..•
of a corporation organized under the laws of [Delaware] or who . . . serves in such a capacity
. . . shall, by such acceptance or by such service, be deemed to have consented to the appoint·
ment of the registered agent of the corporation (or, if there is none, the Secretary of State) as
his agent upon whom service of process may be made in all civil actions or proceedings
against such director for violation of his duty in such capacity. . . . Such acceptance or serv·
ice as a director . . . shall be a signification of the consent of such director . • . that any
process so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served upon such director
within (Delaware].
DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (1980).
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statute vastly expands the Delaware courts' ability to reach nonresident corporate directors by permitting Delaware courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over all nonresident directors of Delaware-chartered corporations. Under
the sequestration method of obtaining jurisdiction, on the other hand, Delaware courts had been able to reach only those directors who owned stock in the
corporations they directed.36 The statute thus reasserts the jurisdictional authority the Shqffer Court destroyed when it invalidated the sequestration
method of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident corporate directors.

II.

THE LAW OF MINIMUM CONTACTS AND THE ROLE OF THE LONG-ARM
STATUTE

Delaware's enactment of the director-consent statute presupposes that a
long-arm statute can provide sufficient contacts between a defendant and a
forum to render the forum's assertion of jurisdiction constitutional.37 Although
the Delaware legislature viewed the Shqffer Court's reference to other directorconsent statutes as an invitation to enact a similar statute,38 this language is
open to other interpretation.39 Whether the absence of the statute was crucial
to the decision that Delaware lacked in personam jurisdiction over the defendants depends on the role a long-arm statute plays in the minimum contacts
analysis.
In an attempt to answer this question, this section examines the genesis and
growth of the minimum contacts analysis. The section demonstrates that minimum contacts analysis requires a threshold finding of the defendant's purposeful acts in connection with the forum before the state's interests in
asserting jurisdiction become relevant. This section applies this analysis to
nonresident corporate directors whose only connection with the forum state is
acceptance of a directorship in a state-chartered corporation and argues that
because acceptance of a directorship does not constitute a purposeful act, the
statute is unconstitutional.
A. THE GENESIS OF MINIMUM CONTACTS

The United States Supreme Court initially defined the role of minimum
36. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1974). Because Delaware law does not require corporate directors to own stock in the corporations they direct, id tit. 8, § 14l(b) (Supp. 1976), some directors of
. Delaware corporations do not own stock in their corporations. The Shqffer plaintiff asserted jurisdiction only over those directors who owned stock in the corporation. 433 U.S. at 192 n.8.
37. Jacobs & Stargatt, Sllpra note 27, at 705; see Jacobs, Personal Jurisdiction Over Corporate Officers
and .Directors: Recent .Developments, 4 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 690, 693 (1979) (Shqffer court indicated result
might have been different ifihere had been applicable long-arm statute); notes 71-78 infra and accompanying text (discussing effect of statute on due process analysis).
38. Jacobs & Stargatt, st~pra note 27, at 705.
39. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 161 (1977) (Shqffer holding implicitly
rejects fictitious consent as sufficient minimum contacts, leaving constitutionality of such statutes in
doubt). In decisions prior to Shqffer, courts had upheld director-consent-to-service statutes. See
Wagenberg v. Charleston Wood Products, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 745,748 (E.D.S.C. 1954) (upholding constitutionality of South Carolina consent-to-service statute; acts complained of occurred within forum);
Well v. B(!resth, 26 Conn. Supp. 428, 428, 225 A.2d 826, 827 (Super. Ct. 1966) (defendant who uses state
for economic benefit cannot avoid jurisdiction by virtue of nonresidency; opinion fails to enumerate
contacts with state). These decisions, however, did not apply a minimum contacts analysis to these
statutes. See notes 49-70 infra and accompanying text (discussing minimum contacts analysis).
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contacts analysis in International Shoe Co. v. Washington .40 In International
Shoe, the Court established that a nonresident defendant's contacts with the
forum could warrant the forum's exercise of jurisdiction and that the defendant's activities within the state could create such contacts.41 The Court rejected
the defendant corporation's contention that because the corporation was not
located within the forum, the assertion of jurisdiction over it violated due process.42 The Supreme Court ruled that the corporation's regular solicitation of
business43 provided "such contacts, ties and relations" between the defendant
and the forum that made the forum's exercise of jurisdiction reasonable and
just.44 The Court gave no examples of other ways in which such contacts might
be established,45 and its decision did not preclude the possibility that other
factors, such as a state's interest in adjudicating the matter, might be equally
capable of creating the necessary minimum contacts.4 6
Because the International Shoe Court did not delineate the boundaries of the
minimum contacts analysis, it left room for speculation about the nature and
components of the minimum contacts test.47 Although the Court stated that
40. 326 u.s. 310 (1945).
41. Id at 316.
42. /d. at 315. The State of Washington initiated the suit to collect contributions the corporation
allegedly owed to Washington's unemployment compensation fund. Id at 311. The defendant was a
Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. /d. at 313. The defendant relied on an earlier Supreme Court decision, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), which held
that a state can exercise in personam jurisdiction only over residents of that state. /d. at 721-22. The
International Shoe decision effectively overruled Pennoyer. See 326 U.S. at 316 (in determining
whether exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendant comports with due process notions of fair
play and substantial justice, courts should examine relationship of defendant to forum state).
43. 326 U.S. at 313-14. The corporation's salesmen lived in Washington and did most of their work
for the corporation in Washington./d.
44. /d. at 320. Although International Shoe purportedly changed the focus of a court's jurisdictional
inquiry from the physical boundaries of a state to the relationship between the defendant and the
forum, a court still must examine the territorial limits of the state in determining whether jurisdictional
assertions comport with due process requirements. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
u.s. 286, 292-93 (1980).
45. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the IJue Process Clause and the In Personam Jurlsdlcllon oftlte
State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 623 (1958) (Court's use
of terms "reasonableness" and "fair play" is conclusory). The Court did indicate that factors other than
the defendant's activities in the state were relevant to the analysis, e.g., the amount of money the de·
fend!Ult earned through transactions with the state's citizens, 326 U.S. at 315; the amount of inconvenience the defendant would experience in defending a suit away from home, id at 317, and the benefits
the defendant received from the state's laws. ld at 319. Nevertheless, the Court did not make clear
whether the defendant's in-state activities in International Shoe were a prere~uisite to jurisdiction or
just one of several factors that could warrant jurisdiction. The Court did establish two dtstinct levels of
contacts: the minimal contacts that support jurisdiction in suits arisin& out of the activities that underlie
the claim, and the greater quantum of contact required to support junsdiction over the defendant in an
unrelated cause of action./d at 317; see notes 68-70 i'!fra and accompanying text (discussing general
and specific jurisdiction).
46. 326 U.S. at 319.
47. Compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 443, 176 N.E.2d
761,766 (1961) (due process satisfied when jurisdiction asserted by forum where both parties can most
conveniently settle their dispute) and Note, Personal Jurisdiction: A New Look at Old Tests, 65 CALIF.
L. REv. 257, 266 (1977) Qogic of International Shoe demands balancing of all relevant interests rather
than merely looking at defendant's contacts with forum to determine jurisdiction) and Note, Tlte
Growth of the International Shoe IJoctrlne, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 523, 524 (1949) (Internallonal Sltoe
requires balancing of interests to determine reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction) with Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal 2d 893, 899, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1969) (International Shoe established two-step analysis; after determining that defendant has acted purposefully
within forum state, court must balance inconvenience to defendant against plaintiff's interest in suing
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factors other than the defendant's activities within the state were relevant to
the minimum contacts inquiry, 48 it did not explain the relative significance of
these factors. The Court thus left open the question whether the minimum
contacts analysis requires a threshold finding of purposeful acts, such as those
present in International Shoe, or permits a strong and properly expressed state
interest to compensate for a paucity of the defendant's purposeful acts.
B. CLARIFICATION OF THE MINIMUM CONTACTS TEST

The Court clarified the minimum contacts test in McGee v. International Ltfe
Insurance Co. 49 and Hanson v. .Denckla.50 Under McGee and.Denckla, a court
may consider the interest of the state in asserting jurisdiction over the nonresident only in those cases where the court finds that the defendant has acted
purposefully and unilaterally to create a contact with the state. The analysis
thus clearly defines the role of the state's interests in determining whether an
individual has minimum contacts with the forum.
McGee involved a suit by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued by
the nonresident defendant insurance company.5 1 The defendant's only contact
with the forum was a solicitation of an insurance policy renewal from the
plaintifl's decedent, who had lived in the forum. 5 2 The Supreme Court upheld
jurisdiction over the nonresident despite the paucity of contacts between the
defendant and the forum. 53 1n reaching its holding, the Court weighed a variety of factors, including the forum's explicit interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refused to pay claims. 54
McGee indicates that when a defendant's acts connecting him with the forum state are few, a state's interests in protecting its citizens may compensate
for that de.ficiency.55 Although the McGee defendant had never entered the
state and had performed only one act related to the forum, he had, by that act,
purposefully connected himself with a resident of the forum state.56 Only after
locally and state's interest in assuming jurisdiction) and Garfinkel & Lavine, Long Arm Jurisdiction in
Cal!fornia under New Section 410.10 ofthe Code ofCivil Procedure, 21 HAsTINGS L.J. 1163, 1200 (1970)
(no balancing of interests required; International Shoe suggests that jurisdiction is reasonable when
defendant has sufficient contacts with state). For a discussion of some of these theories and a recommendation that the various factors in the analysis be relegated to the position of considerations, rather
than requirements, see Comment, Minimum Contacts Confosed and ReConfosed-Variations on a Theme
by International Shoe-Or, Is This Trip Necessary?, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 304 (1970).
48. See note 45 supra (discussing oilier factors Supreme Court indicated were relevant to determination of jurisdiction).
49. 355 u.s. 220 (1957).
50. 357 u.s. 235 (1958).
51. 355 U.S. at 221.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 223.
54. I d. at 222-24. The Court identified other factors that supported jurisdiction in the case. First, the
Court noted the general increase in the number of commerciiif transactions by maiL I d. at 223. Thus,
the defendant's physical absence from the state did not rule out jurisdiction. The Court also pointed
out that improvements in transportation reduce the burdens to the nonresident defendant required to
defend in a distant forum. I d. Finally, the Court stated that in suits arising from insurance contracts,
important witnesses were most likely to be in the insured's state. I d. Inconvenience to the defendant,
. therefore, was not enough to violate due process. I d. at 224.
55. See id at 223-24 (implying that contact sufficient because state has manifest interest in providing
forum for citizens in such cases; state had expressed interest explicitly in statute).
56. See id (contract delivered in forum, preiniums mailed from forum, and insured resided in forum
when he died).
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establishing the defendant's purposeful act did the Court consider the state's
interests in adjudicating the suit. McGee thus represents the first step in the
Court's creation of a threshold purposeful act requirement.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hanson v. .Denck/a57 further clarified the
threshold requirement. The Hanson plaintiffs attempted to rely on McGee to
obtain jurisdiction over a trustee who did not reside within the forum. 5 8 The
disputed trust had been created in the trustee's state, and the settlor had subsequently moved to the forum state.59 The Court, however, distinguished McGee, pointing out that the trustee inHanson had not performed any acts in the
forum comparable to the McGee defendant's solicitation. 60 The Court rejected
the argument that the interests of the state in settling estates61 and of the parties who would be affected by the resolution of the suit could compensate for
the trustee's failure to conduct business in connection with the state.62 Rather,
the issue had to be resolved by evaluating the nonresident trustee's acts before
considering the interests of the state and the other parties.63
The Court's decisions in McGee and Hanson demonstrate that minimum
contacts analysis requires a threshold determination that the defendant acted
purposefully to create a contact with the forum state.64 When the defendant's
activities in connection with the state are sufficient to constitute a purposeful
act, but are insufficient, without more, to permit the forum to exercise jurisdiction, state interests may compensate for the defendant's minimal contacts.65
57. 357 u.s. 235 (1958).
58. Id. at 250-51.
59. I d. at 238. Several years after moving to the forum, the settlor died. I d. at 239. The suit involved
a dispute between the trust beneficiaries and those who would take the trust assets under the residuary
clause of the settlor's will if the trust were declared invalid. I d. at 240.
60. Id. at 252.
61. Id at 253-54.
62. Id at 254. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black argued that the state's interest in resolving
disputes concerning the settlor's estate should weigh in favor of jurisdiction over the trustee. He emphasized that the trustee had voluntarily chosen to maintain a business relationship with the settlor for
eight years after the settlor moved to the forum. Id at 258-59.
63. Id at 253.
64. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (fortuitous circumstances connecting defendant with forum do not provide required contacts; defendant's acts must cause
contacts); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) (sufficient contacts are established only by acts
of defendant); Folk & Moyer, Sefjllestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 13 CoLUM. L. RI!V.
749, 798-99 (1973) (Supreme Court has held nonresidents may be subject to suit when defendant's
activities of particular interest to state); Gorfinkel & Lavine, Long Arm Jurlsdlcllon in California under
New Section 410.10 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1163, 1192 (1970) (defendant, and
not some third party, must initiate the contacts between the state and himself; no balancing test required); Louis, The Grasp oJ Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C. L. Rl!v. 407, 422 (1980) (from
Hanson to World-Wide Volkswagen, Court developed bifurcated jurisdiction inquiry, requiring
threshold finding of defendant's contacts with the forum); Note, The Long-Arm Shrinks: The Supreme
Court and the Problem ofthe Nonresident Defendant in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 58 DI!N.
LJ. 667, 674 (1981) (conduct of defendant creates necessary affiliating circumstances for jurisdiction).
65. q: Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modern Pte·
diction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARIZ. L. Rl!v. 861, 883 (1978) (legitimate state interest may be additional prerequisite to jurisdiction); Developments in the Low: Slate Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HAR.v. L. Rl!v. 909, 924 (1960) (mconvenience to defendant weighed against state and
plaintifi's interests to determine whether assertion of jurisdiction fair); Note, Personal Jurisdiction: A
New Look at Old Tests, 65 CALIF. L. Rl!v. 257, 266 (1977) (International Shoe requires courts to balance interests in determining whether defendant has sufficient contacts); Note, Measuring the Long Arm
oJter Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rl!v. 126, 127 (1978) (Shqffer court suggests long arm statute
may enable otherwise insufficient contacts to satisfy due process).
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State interests, however, may not supplant completely the purposeful acts
requirement. 66
Once the defendant's acts meet the threshold test, the quality and quantity of
those acts may be placed on a continuum.67 At one end of the continuum are
contacts sufficient to warrant general jurisdiction.68 At the other end are contacts that pass the threshold test, but are so meager that other compelling interests must be present to justify the assertion of jurisdiction.6 9 When the
defendant's contacts with the forum are minimal, a strong and properly expressed state interest may permit the court to assert jurisdiction.70
In sum, the Supreme Court has. established a minimum contacts requirement for state court assertions of jurisdiction over nonresidents. In order to
find such contacts, a state court must first determine whether the defendant's
acts connecting him with the state are sufficient to meet the threshold purposeful act requirement. If they are, the court may go on to weigh the quantity
and quality of the defendant's purposeful acts against the other relevant
interests.
C. APPLICATION OF THE MINIMUM CONTACTS TEST TO NONRESIDENT
CORPORATE DIRECTORS

Two aspects of Shaffer's minimum contacts analysis indicate that Delaware's enactment of the director-consent statute does not overcome the due
process problems that resulted in the Court's invalidation of the sequestration
procedure. First, Shqffer follows the minimum contacts analysis developed in
McGee and Hanson. Application of this analysis to the nonresident corporate
directors who have no other connection with the forum state reveals that Delaware's enactment of a long-arm statute does not cure the absence of the threshold requirement of a purposeful act. Second, the Delaware legislature
misinterpreted the Shaffer Court's discussion of Delaware's failure to enact a
66. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (although forum has
strong interest in applying its law to controversy, due process divests state of power to assert jurisdiction
when defendant has no contacts with state); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 100 (1978) (although
forum has substantial interests in protecting resident children in action for support, state cannot assert
jurisdiction over nonresident father who derives no benefit from children's presence in state and who
has no other contact with state).
67. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 899, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. ·
113, 118 (1969) (after establishing that defendant engaged in activity of requisite quality and nature in
forum state and that cause of action connected sufficiently with activity, court should balance inconvenience to defendant against interests ou;::tiff to determine whether to assert Jurisdiction).
68. See Perkins v. Benguet ConsoL
· g Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952) (if defendant's contacts
are substantial, but cause of action unrelated to contacts, jurisdiction constitutional); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,318 (1945) (in some cases defendant's continuous operations in state
so substantial and of such a nature as to justify jurisdiction in suits unrelated to activities).
69. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (if defendant's activities in
state give rise to liabilities involved in suit, defendant deemed present for jurisdictional purposes); Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (when state has expressed by statute regulatory interest in particularly dangerous activity, defendant subject to state's jurisdiction under long-arm statute). See generally
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: IJue Process Limitations on Stale Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SuP. CT.
REv. 77, 82-88 (discussing difference between jurisdiction based on continuous activity unrelated to suit
and contacts related to suit).
70. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. at 223 (state has manifest interest in providing
residents with forum for redress against insurers refusing to pay claims); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352,
356 (1927) (statute resulting from strong state regulatory interest in highway safety warrants state jurisdiction in suits arising from nonresidents' use of highways).
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long-arm statute; the Court did not indicate that such a statute would compensate for the virtual absence of the defendants' purposeful acts.
The enactment of the director-consent statute does not affect the Shaffer
Court's minimum contacts analysis. The Court rejected the contention that
Delaware's interest in supervising the management of its corporations justified
Delaware jurisdiction.71 Further, the Court determined that a nonresident's
acceptance of a directorship in a Delaware corporation did not constitute a
sufficient purposeful act. 72 The Court's refusal to consider state interests as a
justification for asserting jurisdiction without a threshold finding of the defendant's purposeful act is thus consistent with the McGee-Hanson analysis.
Because a long-arm statute merely reflects the state's interests in asserting jurisdiction, the statute does not alter the due process requirement that led the
Shaffer Court to invalidate the sequestration procedure.73 Proof of the state's
interest in adjudicating a matter does not substitute for the constitutional requirement of a purp'oseful act.
Neither of the two contexts in which the Shaffer Court mentioned the absence of a statute supports the Delaware legislature's view that the opinion
invited enactment of the long-arm statute. The Court first discussed the failure
to enact a long-arm statute in refuting the contention that Delaware's strong
71. 433 U.S. at 215.
72. Id. at 215-16. The Court reasoned that although Delaware corporation law might provide substantial benefits to corporate directors, the directors "simply had nothing to do with the State of Delaware." I d. at 216.
Justice Brennan dissented from Part IV of Shqffer, in which the Court held that acceptance of a
directorship in a Delaware corporation did not constitute a purposeful act sufficient to create minimum
contacts. 433 U.S. at 216-17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan
stated that the defendants' voluntary relationship with a Delaware corporation should constitute sufficient minimum contacts with Delaware. Id. at 227-28. The lower courts have disagreed on whether
acceptance of a directorship is a sufficient contact with the forum state. See Miller v. American Tel. &
TeL Co., 394 F. Supp. 58, 63 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (statute permitting jurisdiction over persons whose out·
of-state acts cause harm in state may not permit jurisdiction over nonresident director whose breach of
fiduciary duty causes indirect harm to shareholder), qffd mem., 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976); Lawson v.
Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 298 F. Supp. 373, 377-79 (D. Md. 1969) (because nonresident directors' decisions carried out within forum, forum may exercise jurisdiction over directors; open question
whether defendants' status as directors of corporation chartered by forum would be sufficient); cf.
Ellwein v. Sun-Rise, Inc., 295 Minn. 109, 110, 203 N.W.2d 403, 405 (1972) Oong-arm statute adequate
to permit assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident directors of corporation with home in
forum; fact that defendants never entered forum not decisive when no more convenient forum exists).
73. Couching the Delaware statute in terms of consent adds nothing to the due process analysis. See,
e.g., Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953) (implied consent has no constitutional
significance absent minimum contacts); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,318 (1945)
(when corporations held amenable to suit based on implied consent, corporations' acts justify fiction of
consent); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1085-89 (D. Kan. 1978) (exercise of
jurisdiction based on governmentally imposed consent cannot be sustained absent minimum contacts).
But see Jacobs, supra note 37, at 696 (consent is independent basis for asserting state court jurisdiction;
no difference between signing consent form and accepting directorship with knowledge of conse·
quences).
Voluntary consent to jurisdiction would legitimize an assertion ofjurisdiction in the absence of minimum contacts. q: D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972) (consent valid when
defendant voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived rights). A person's waiver of his constitutional right not to be subjected to the jurisdiction of a state with which he lacks minimum contacts,
however, is not voluntary when the state has elicited the waiver by offering a benefit otherwise to be
withheld. Cf. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967) (when state offers benefit conditioned
on relinquishment of constitutional right, relinquishment not truly voluntary); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (state may not apply eligibility provisions for unemployment benefits to compel
worker to abandon religious convictions).
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interest justified its assertion of jurisdiction.74 The Court pointed to the absence of a long-arm statute as an indication that Delaware's interest in adjudicating suits involving nonresident corporate directors was not as strong as
claimed.75 The court went on to emphasize that, even if Delaware did have a
strong interest in such litigation, that interest might warrant the application of
Delaware law to the controversy, t?ut could not justify the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresident directors. 76
The Court also referred to the absence of a long-arm statute in rejecting the
argument that acceptance of a directorship satisfied the minimum contacts requirement.77 The CQurt observed that the defendants had not" 'purposefully
avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state."'7 8 They not only had failed to perform any act in connection with Delaware, but they also "had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware
court" because Delaware had not enacted a director-consent statute.79 Thus,
the state's attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the nonresidents posed the additional problem of lack of notice. The reference to the absence of a long-arm
statute was an afterthought, not an iinplication that providing notice would
remedy the absence of minimum contacts.
McGee, Hanson, and Shaffer make clear that the state's interests do not
enter into minimum contacts analysis until the defendant's acts meet this
threshold requirement. Shaffer also clearly indicates that a nonresident's acceptance of a directorship in a corporation chartered by the forum does not
satisfy the threshold purposeful act requirement. Unless, contrary to the
Supreme Court's finding in Shaffer, acceptance of a directorship does constitute the requisite purposeful act, the Delaware statute suffers from the same
constitutional infirmities as the sequestration procedure.
Ill.

THE DEFINITION OF PURPOSEFUL

Acr

In Shaffer, the Supreme Court did not articulate why acceptance of a directorship did not constitute a sufficient purposeful act.80 The Court's silence
leaves room for speculation about the essential ingredients of the required act.
This section therefore examines the nature of the purposeful act requirement
and argues that Shaffer correctly concluded that acceptance of a directorship
was not a sufficient purposeful act.
Courts usually characterize purposeful acts in terms of their results. For ex74. 433 U.S. at 214-15.
75. Id The Court stated: "If Delaware perceived its interest in securing jurisdiction over COC£0rate
fiduciaries to be as great as Heitner suggests, we would expect it to have enacted a statute more clearly
designed to protect that interest." Id
76. Id at 216.
77. Id at 215-16.
78. Id at 215.
79. Id at 216.
80. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAR.v. L. REv. 70, 161 (1977) (S!tqffer Court implicitly
rejected defendant's voluntary association with state-created entity and state interest in supervising
affairs of its corporations as bases for upholding nonresident director-consent-to-service statutes).
As Justice Brennan noted, in concluding that acceptance of a directorship did not consititute a sufficient purposeful act, the Court was ''unable to draw upon a proper factual record" because the trial
court had not considered the minimum contacts issue. 433 U.S. at 220 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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ample, a corporation may commit purposeful acts by availing itself of the benefits and protections of the incorporating state's laws and reaping significant
economic returns. 81 Another result of purposeful acts is that the defendant can
reasonably foresee being haled before the tribunals of the state. 82 The primary
results of purposeful acts thus include economic gain, reliance on and benefit
from state law, and foreseeability of suits within the forum. Arguably, any act
that has these results is, by definition, a purposeful act.
Whether a nonresident defendant benefits from the laws of the forum is a
question that arises most often in cases involving foreign corporations rather
than individuals. 83 State laws conducive to successful business enterprises confer benefits on foreign corporations that do business in the forum. 84 Foreign
corporations also benefit from laws that grant access to state courts to enforce
corporate rights against a resident. 85 Fairness requires, therefore, that a state's
citizens have recourse to the state's courts to redress wrongs committed by a
nonresident corporation.86 When a foreign corporation gains significant economic and legal benefits from conducting activity within the state, it is reasonable to infer from these results the corporation's purposeful act in obtaining
such benefits.
Directors of corporations also may derive substantial benefits from a state's
laws without ever entering the state or dealing directly with its residents. Although a director may conduct his business activities in another state, he derives his power from the laws of the state of incorporation. 87 Delaware's laws
in particular give broad powers,88 as well as many personal advantages, 89 to its
corporations' directors. Because such benefits are the result of the act of accepting a directorship, such an act arguably could constitute a purposeful act
sufficient to validate a chartering state's assertion of jurisdiction.90
81. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (to extent corporation conducts activities in state, it enjoys benefits and protections of state laws; fair to require it to defend suit
based on such l:?enefits); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 902, 458 P.2d 57, 64, 80
Cal Rptr. ll3, 120 (1969) (defendant corporation's economic benefit from state supports finding that it
has purposefully engaged in economic activity in forum).
82. q. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978) (no jurisdiction when defendant could not
have foreseen being haled into forum).
83. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 227 (1957) (defendant out-of-state
insurance company solicited contract renewal from state resident); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,
339 U.S. 643, 646 (1950) (defendant out-of-state insurance company solicited insurance contract from
state resident); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945) {defendant out-of-state
shoe manufacturer's agents solicited orders from state residents).
84. See note 81 supra (discussing financial benefits that accrue to nonresident corporation). But cf.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (financial benefits accruing to
defendant from collateral relation to forum do not support jurisdiction if they do not stem from constitutionally cognizable contacts with the state).
85. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
86. See id. (discussing fairness of state enforcement of foreign corporation's obligations to state
residents).
87. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (1974) (directors have power to manage affairs of
corporation).
88. See Note, Measuring the Long Arm After Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 126, 132-33 &
n.SO (1978) (Delaware law pro-management because management allowed broad power and permits
shareholders to increase management's authority).
89. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (1974) (directors allowed interest-free, unsecured loans from
corporation); id. § 145 (indemnification in actions arising from activities as director).
90. See Note, Measuring the Long Arm After Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126, 132-33
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The legal and financial benefits directors receive as a result of incorporation
in a particular state, however, do not justify the inference that acceptance of a
directorship is a purposeful act. Corporate directors often do not choose the
state of incorporation; many directors do not even join the board until after the
corporation's organizers have chosen a chartering state.91 The financial benefits and legal protections that directors receive are collateral benefits that accrue from an indirect relationship with the forum state.92 As the Court in
World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 93 observed, such indirect benefits
are insufficient to satisfy the purposeful act requirement. 94 Rather, directors
must deliberately avail themselves of the benefits of the forum state.
The foreseeability that one may be called into the courts of a particular forum is also insufficient, without more, to meet the purposeful act requirement.
By enacting a long-arm statute, Delaware provided the foreseeable result that
nonresident corporate directors might be called into Delaware courts. A state's
assertion of jurisdiction, however, is not valid merely because the defendant
can foresee the possibility of suit in that forum. 95 If this were the case, states
could obtain jurisdiction over all nonresidents simply by enacting long-arm
statutes purporting to authorize personal jurisdiction over all nonresidents.
Although purposeful acts often are defined by their results, not all behavior
that results in .financial gain, legal benefit and foreseeability of suits within the
forum state constitute a purposeful act. The Supreme Court rejected this contention in World- Wide Volkswagen .96 A sound basis thus exists for the Court's
conclusion in Shaffer that acceptance of a directorship does not constitute a
sufficient act for the minimum contacts test. 97 A purposeful act is a required
component of the minimum contacts analysis, and acceptance of a directorship
does not qualify as such a purposeful act. Thus, the Delaware nonresident
(1978) (benefits and protections corporate directors knowingly reap should provide constitutionally sufficient basis for jurisdiction).
91. Directors, of course, sometimes may be responsible for deciding to reincorporate in another
forum.
92. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court stated that an Oklahoma court could not assert jurisdiction over an automobile dealer who did business in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. 444 U.S.
at 298. The Court concluded that although the defendants received "substantial revenue" as a result of
sales of automobiles that could travel to Oklahoma and be serviced by Volkswagen service facilities,
such financial benefits were the result of a "collateral relation" to the forum state. Id at 299. Because
such benefits did not stem from a "constitutionally cognizable contact" with Oklahoma, they could not
support jurisdiction. Id Similarly, when a nonresident corporate director accepts a directorship in a
Delaware corporation, he obtains legal and financial benefits as a result of a collateral, indirect relationship with the forum state. Thus, the benefits that directors receive are "too attenuated a contact to
justify [a) State's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over them." Id
93. 444 u.s. 286 (1980).
94. See id at 299 (financial benefits accruing to defendant from collateral relation to forum do not
support jurisdiction if they do not stem from constitutionally copnzable contacts with forum); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (father who merely acqwesces in daughter's decision to live with
mother in forum state does not purposefully avail himself of benefits and protections of forum's laws).
95. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (foreseeability alone is
not sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: the End ofan Era, 53
N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 66 (1978) (reasonable expectations of the parties have always been element of
International Shoe test, but statute has never defined expectations).
96. See notes 92-94 supra and accompanying text (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen).
97. 433 U.S. at 215-16; see note 21 supra and accompanying text (discussin,g Shaffer Court's finding
that acceptance of directorship does not constitute purposeful act under minimum contacts analysis).
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director-consent-to-service statute is unconstitutional in its application to nonresident directors who have no other ties with the state.

IV. ARMSTRONG V. POMERANCE:

DELAWARE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS
THE CONSENT-TO-SERVICE STATUTE

The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the consent-to-service statute in
Armstrong v. Pomerance .98 In Armstrong, the court determined that the statute
remedied the minimum contacts problems posed by the sequestration procedure.99 Contrary to the clear implication in Shqffer that acceptance of a directorship does not constitute a purposeful act, the Delaware court held that by
accepting directorships in Delaware corporations, the defendants had purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of Delaware's laws.l 00 An analysis of
Armstrong reveals that its reasoning is at odds with the Supreme Court's minimum contacts analysis.
The Armstrong defendants were directors of a Delaware corporation whose
principal place of business was in Boise, Idaho. 101 None of the directors lived
or conducted business in Delaware. 102 In asserting that Delaware had jurisdiction, the plaintiff relied solely on the defendants' election as directors of the
Delaware corporation. 103 The defendants maintained that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to them. 104 Relying on Shqffer, they argued that mere
status as a director is not a sufficient contact to support in personam
jurisdiction.tos
The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the consent-to-service statute.to6 Although articulated in terms of fairness rather than minimum contacts, the Delaware Court's reasoning appeared to follow the Supreme Court's purposeful
act and state interest balancing analysis. 107 Under the court's reasoning, by
accepting directorships in a Delaware corporation and receiving significant
benefits and protections under Delaware law, the defendants committed the
purposeful acts necessary to support in personam jurisdiction. 108 The court
next concluded that because Delaware had a significant interest in actively
overseeing the conduct of those owing fiduciary duties to shareholders of Delaware corporations, the exercise of jurisdiction was fair. 109
In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized that Delaware law empowered the defendants to act in their capacity as directors, and that the transac98. 423 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980).
99. Id at 178-79.
100. Id at 176.
101. Id. at 175.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court dismissed the suit against those defendants who had accepted their positions
before the effective date of the consent-to-service statute. I d.
104. Id at 176.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 178-79.
107. See notes 64-70 supra and accompanying text (discussing purposeful act requirement and significance of state interest in minimum contacts analysis).
108. 423 A.2d at 176.
109. See id at 176-77 (requirement that defendants impliedly consent to Delaware jurisdiction not
unreasonable provided that consent requirement serves legitimate purpose).
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tion challenged in the suit arose from their activities as directors.11o In
addition, unlike the Shqffer defendants, the directors in Armstrong had explicit
notice through the consent statute that Delaware courts could exercise jurisdiction over them in suits that involved their acts as directors.m The court thus
asserted that the defendants' acts satisfied the purposeful act requirement and
balanced the state's interests in asserting jurisdiction.
The Armstrong court, however, failed to follow the Supreme Court's minimum contacts analysis in holding the statute constitutional. The Del~ware
court balanced state interests without actually satisfying the purposeful act requirement. The court rejected Shqffer's conclusion that acceptance of a directorship does ·not constitute a purposeful act sufficient to satisfy minimum
contacts. 112 The Armstrong court instead implied that because the directors
derived their power from state law and took advantage of the pro-management
slant of Delaware's laws, 113 the exercise of jurisdiction was fair. 11 4 The Shaffer
Court took note of these same factors, but nonetheless concluded that the purposeful act requirement was not satisfied because the directors "simply had
nothing to do with the state ofDelaware." 115 The court thus rested its conclusion primarily on the strength of Delaware's interest in adjudicating shareholder derivative suits involving directors of its corporations.
Even assuming that the plaintiff met the threshold test, however, the constitutional significance of the state interests that the court identified is questionable.116 The court observed that Delaware has a legitimate interest in
developing its law through careful judicial interpretation of its statutes 117 and
in providing a judicial forum for aggrieved shareholders. 118 The other interests
identified by the court as justifications for Delaware jurisdiction, however, are
suspect. These interests include providing a forum for redress of injuries suffered by the corporation and ensuring that Delaware law defines the fiduciary
duties of Delaware directors. 119
110. Id. at 176.
Ill. Id.
112. 433 U.S. at 216; see note 22 supra and accompanying text (discussing Shqffer).
113. 423 A.2d at 178 (quoting Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 650-51).
114. 423 A.2d at 176. The court also argued that Shaffir's conclusion that acceptance of a directorship is not a sufficent purposeful act to create minimum contacts was "pure dicta" because the minimum contacts issue had not been presented to the lower court. Id at 179; see note 21 supra (discussing
Justice Brennan's conclusion that the part of Sha.ffer dealing with purposeful acts was merely an "advisory opinion"). The court, however, proceeded to argue that there were "obvious and substantial distinctions" between Shqffer and Armstrong. 423 A.2d at 179. First, the court observed that the directorconsent statute was unlike the sequestration statute in Shaffer, which based jurisdiction on the defendants' status as shareholders. The director-consent statute derived jurisdiction over actions involving the
directors' duties to the corporation from the defendants' activities as directors. Id at 179-80. Second,
the statute provided notice to directors that they could be subject to suits in the incorporating state. Id
at 180.
115. 433 U.S. at 215-16.
116. See Brilmayer, supra note 69, at 105-07 (discussing problems with using state interests as basis
for jurisdiction); Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 649 (analyzing Delaware's claimed interest in
supervising corporations).
117. 423 A.2ii at 177-78; see Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 649-50 (Delaware's real interest,
attracting corporations through pro-management statutes interpreted by pro-management courts, may
serve incidental constitutionally significant purpose of ensuring consistent and knowledgable interpretation of the laws).
118. 423 A.2d at 178; Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 650.
119. 423 A.2d at 176 n.5.
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The Armstrong court noted that the corporation was a resident of Delaware
and that the nonresident directors had injured the corporate resident by
breaching their fiduciary duties. 120 The court thus suggested that the state's
interest in providing a forum for shareholder derivative litigation paralleled its
interest in providing a forum for residents harmed by nonresidents. 121 This
logic fails, however, because the corporation conducted business in Idaho, not
in Delaware.l 22 The corporation was a resident· of Delaware in only the most
~echnical sense. 123
The legitimacy of Delaware's interest in ensuring that Delaware law governs
suits against Delaware directors poses greater difficulties. Armstrong rejected
Shaffer's conclusion that although state interests might require the application
of Delaware law to controversies over the directors' activities, such interests
did not necessarily permit Delaware to assert jurisdiction. 124 The court suggested instead that Delaware should have personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the controversy because of the danger that another state might
apply choice of law principles mandating the use of laws other than Delaware's.125 For instance, choice of law considerations may lead a state to apply
its own law governing the fiduciary duties of directors to foreign corporations
doing business in the state. 126 The only constitutional limitation on a state
court's ability to apply its own law is the requirement that a state with no
interest must apply the law of an interested state. 127 Thus, Delaware's interest
in keeping the case out of forums that might not apply Delaware law is of
little, if any, constitutional significance.
V. NONRESIDENT DIRECTORS: THE CASE FOR AN EXCEPTION TO THE
MINIMUM CONTACTS REQUIREMENT

TheArmstrong court feared that if the director-consent statute were declared
unconstitutional, and Delaware courts could not obtain jurisdiction over nonresident corporate directors, aggrieved shareholders might be deprived completely of a forum in which to conduct derivative litigation. 128 Moreover, the
Sh'!lfer Court specifically reserved the question whether a forum with which
the defendant lacked minimum conta~s could exercise jurisdiction if no other
120. Id. at 176.
121. Id. at 178-79.
122. I d. at 175; see Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 648 (concept of personhood of corporation
stretched beyond reasonable bounds when corporation suffered injury m Delaware because manager in
another state made decision affecting business operations in third state).
123. C.f. Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 648 (corporation in Shajftr was not a "victimized locnl
corporation").
124. 423 A.2d at 177 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215-16 (1977)).
125. 423 A.2d at 177.
126. See Oldham, .Regulating the .Regulators: Limitations upon a Stale's Ability to .Regulate Corporalions with Multistate Contracts, 5 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 181,202 (1980) (local law sometimes applies to suits
involving foreign corporations doing business in state).
127. See Currie, The Constitution and the ''Transitory" Cause ofAction, 13 HARV. L. REv. 36, 76
(1959) (full faith and credit clause requires court of state which has no interest in controversy to apply
law of interested state).
128. 423 A.2d at 177-78. The court identified the possibility that shareholders might be deprived of
any forum at all as one of the "significant ramifications which would undeniably (and unfortunately)
flow from a conclusion that§ 3114 cannot constitutionally be applied to corporate directors in shareholder derivative actions." I d.
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forum were available. 129 Necessity, therefore, may warrant an exception to the
minimum contacts requirement.I3o
An exercise of jurisdiction, without purposeful contacts by the defendant,
may be constitutional when denial of jurisdiction would effectively deny the
plaintiff any forum at all. 131 As the Armstrong court noted, plaintiffs in shareholder derivative suits may be deprived completely of a forum if the chartering
state cannot exercise jurisdiction. 132 Directors often lack minimum contacts
with other states in which the corporation can also be sued. 133 Thus, the special
attributes of shareholder derivative litigation frequently may pose circumstances in which practical necessity requires an exception to the minimum contacts requirement.
Although practical necessity may legitimize an exception to the minimum
contacts requirement, it does not necessarily render the nonresident directorconsent-to-service statute constitutional. Exceptions to constitutionally mandated jurisdictional requirements should be granted only in specific cases when
necessity actually exists. 134 Necessity does not exist in all cases in which the
Delaware statute would permit the exercise of jurisdiction. Although a general
exception to the minimum contacts requirement in the cases of all nonresident
corporate directors would supply certainty and simplicity, nevertheless, it
would be unsatisfactory. As the Shqffer Court observed, "the cost of simplifying the litigation by avoiding the jurisdictional question may be the sacrifice of
'fair play and substantial justice.' That cost is too high.''l3s
Although the necessity exception may permit a state to exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant who lacks minimum contacts with the state, it does not follow
that the state of incorporation is the proper state to assert jurisdiction. Choice
129. 433 U.S. at 211 n.37; see Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950) (state
should be permitted to maintain suit when maintenance elsewhere might be impossible).
130. 433 U.S. at 211, n.37. See Dillyort, Jurisdiction over Nonresident JJirectors, 0/Jicers, and Shareholders: "JJirector"Consenl Statutesajler Shafferv. Heitner, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 255; 287 n.l61 (1979)
(Shqffer Court's reservation of issue whether jurisdiction based on property in state would satisfY due
process when no other forum available and approval of status as basis for jursidiction support notion
that minimum contacts not required in every case).
Another possible exception to the minimum contacts requirement might be based on the absence of
inconvenience to defendant nonresident corporate directors. Delaware corporations may indemnity
directors for expenses, thereby mitigating the inconvenience and expense of defending suits in distant
forums. DEL CooE. ANN. tit 8, § 145 (1975) (allowing co~ration to repay expenses of officers incurred in defending suits resulting from their corporate actiVIties); see Dillport, supra at 289 (discussing
indemnification as factor mitigating inconvenience to defendant). Although one of the goals of the
minimum contacts requirement is fairness to the defendant, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310,320 (1945), the Court has rejected the argument that a forum may exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant who lacks minimum contacts with the forum as long as the forum is a convenient one for the
defendant. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (even if defendant would suffer no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before tribunals of another state, the
due process clause may divest forum of jurisdiction where defendant has no minimum contacts). Convenience to the defendant, therefore, is an inadequate justification for an exception to the minimum
contacts requirement
131. Dillport, supra note 130, at 262.
132. 423 A.2d at 178 (citing Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 650-51).
133. Dillport, supra note 130, at 262. The corporation is usually an indispensible party in shareholder derivative suits. Id
134. Cf. Brilmayer, supra note 69, at 108-10 (if exception to minimum contacts requirement granted,
should be narrowly drawn exception).
135. 433 U.S. at 211; if. Oldham, supra note 126, at 202 (absurd to sacrifice policy concerns for
certainty in area of corporate choice of law).
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of law considerations, such as the state's interest in adjudicating the suit, 13 6 do
not require that the incorporating state exercise jurisdiction. Moreover, considerations of fairness and convenience may point to the corporation's princi.
pal place of business as a more appropriate forum.l3 7
Although choice of law considerations may result in the application of the
incorporating state's law, such considerations do not always point to the state
of incorporation as the forum by necessity. As theArmstrong Court noted, the
incorporating state's law does not necessarily apply to suits arising from
breaches of fiduciary duties by corporate directors. 138 Choice of law principles
may require instead that the court apply to such actions the substantive law of
the state· where the corporation conducts its business. 139 The general rule that
the incorporating state's law governs the duties of directors to the corporation
is based on the need for a uniform and certain standard, rather than on the
state's interests in the litigation. 14 Choice of law principles, therefore, do not
justify a constitutional requirement that the incorporating state be the forum
by necessity, especially if other factors enable prospective defendants to anticipate applicable law.l41
Convenience to corporate directors also supports the principal place of business as the forum by necessity. Many corporate boards are composed of insiders who are executives employed by the corporation. 142 Because many
directors work for the companies-they direct, jurisdiction by necessity in the
principal place of business is likely to deprive fewer directors of due process
than would jurisdiction in the state of incorporation in which none of the directors may live or work.

°

CONCLUSION

Because the minimum contacts test has evolved into a two-stage analysis
with a threshold purposeful act requirement, a state's interest in adjudicating
alone cannot support a finding of minimum contacts. The act of accepting a
directorship does not qualify as a purposeful act and thus cannot move the
analysis to its second tier. Delaware's nonresident director-consent-to-service
statute is therefore unconstitutional because it does not satisfy the minimum
contacts requirement when a defendailt's only purposeful act connecting him
with the state is the acceptance of a directorship. Shareholder derivative suits,
however, present a need for an exception to the Court's minimum _contacts
136. See text accompanying note 76 supra (discussing Slzqjfer Court's analysis of choice of law
principles).
137. Cf. Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1947) (under modem
conditions, corporations obtain charters from states where they do no business; place of corporate domicile in such circumstances entitled to little consideration under doctrine offorum non conveniens).
138. 423 A.2d at 177.
139. See Oldham, supra note 126, at 202-04 (commercial domicile has greater interest in corporation
than chartering state has and therefore should apply its own law).
140. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 n.44 (1977).
141. C.f. Oldham, supra note 126, at 202 (uncertainty as to which law will apply rectified by reincorporating in state of pnncipal place of business).
142. See Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293, 302-03
(1979) (corporations continue to fill their boards with insiders). But if. Dillport, supra note 130, at 264
(trend toward increase in outsiders on corporate boards).

HeinOnline -- 70 Geo. L. J. 1226 1981-1982

1982]

DIRECTOR-CONSENT STATUTE

1227

requirement because plaintiffs may be deprived of a forum unless courts permit such an exception. Considerations of fairness and convenience to nonresident directors suggest that the forum by necessity should be the corporation's
principal place of business rather than the state of incorporation.
Susan Stuckert
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